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Revolution without Guarantees 
Community and Subjectivity in Nancy, Lingis, 
Sartre and Levinas 
Andrew Ryder 
University of Pittsburgh 
Jean-Luc Nancy’s The Inoperative Community, a collection of writings first 
published in 1985 and 1986, suggests an understanding of community as 
irreducibly linked to finitude. Alongside this, he advocates a redefinition of 
the project of revolutionary communism.1 This endeavor draws equally on 
the writings on communication of Georges Bataille and the insistence on 
finitude found in Martin Heidegger. First, we should recapitulate Nancy’s 
argument in order to determine his presentation of a novel politics as well as 
the links and disjunctions of his predecessors. More than this, I would like to 
suggest that a reading of Alphonso Lingis’s The Community of Those Who 
Have Nothing in Common, published almost a decade later, suggests an 
intriguing and promising extension or modification of Nancy’s argument. In 
particular, Lingis suggests an understanding of revolution that appears 
somewhat closer to the Marxist tradition. I argue that this is partly a result of 
an inheritance from Emmanuel Levinas, and in particular his account of 
ethical subjectivity, which, surprisingly, can be productively allied with the 
political thought of Jean-Paul Sartre. This friendship between the ethics of 
Levinas and the politics of Sartre suggests the best groundwork for Lingis’s 
development of Nancy’s insights.2 
 
Heidegger and the Political 
Heidegger is a notoriously controversial figure as a result of his involvement 
in the German National Socialist Party.3 There are many possible 
understandings of the bearing of this complicity on Heidegger’s thought, 
ranging from total dismissal of its significance to complete rejection of his 
ideas as fascist propaganda. Of those who maintain an inheritance of 
Heidegger’s ideas while rejecting his political beliefs, alternate explanations 
have been presented regarding the elements of his thought that are 
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dispensable and culpable as opposed to those that remain valuable.4  Nancy 
states his position on this matter as characterized by a distinction between 
Heidegger’s correct insight regarding the finitude of the subject and his 
failure to carry this understanding into his appreciation of the social: 
All of Heidegger’s research into ‘being-for (or toward-) death’ was 
nothing other than an attempt to state this: I is not—am not—a 
subject. (Although, when it came to the question of community as 
such, the same Heidegger also went astray with his vision of a 
people and a destiny conceived at least in part as a subject, which 
proves no doubt that Dasein’s ‘being-toward-death’ was never 
radically implicated in its being-with—in Mitsein—and that it is 
this implication that remains to be thought.)5 
Nancy endorses Heidegger’s account of “being-towards-death” as essential 
to the constitution of Dasein (being-in-the-world) and argues that this has 
the effect of ruling out true subjectivity for an account of existence. 
However, Nancy argues that Heidegger’s appreciation of being-with others 
failed to fully appreciate the effect of this thought, and this mistake led to an 
unreflective consideration of the social that asserts a collective subject, in this 
case disastrously. 
The other crucial thinker for The Inoperative Community, Bataille, had 
previously written criticisms of Heidegger, most extensively in a review of a 
very early book by Levinas, Existence and Existents.6 One of Bataille’s points 
of disagreement with Heidegger is stylistic; he reads Heidegger as 
“laborious,” “gluey;” his writing “never achieves in itself the annihilation of 
thinking.”7 In other words, Bataille believes that Heidegger’s style is too 
pedantically philosophical and that he fails to achieve the freedom of poetry. 
Bataille links this to a lack of passion and an account of the authentic that 
fails to include truly singular experiences of intensity.8 He associates this 
with cowardice, culminating in the opportunism and conformism of 
Heidegger’s Nazi involvement. 
This accusation is aimed at Heidegger’s understanding of society, 
according to which authenticity is defined as a resolute acceptance of an 
“essential rank,” which he seems to view rather literally as maintenance of 
social roles and hierarchy.9 In contrast, Bataille insists on human truth as a 
rejection of “the miserable ladders of power” and an experience “outside of 
being.”10 These criticisms are compatible with Nancy’s revision of 
Heidegger’s thought and anticipate his argument. Nancy’s understanding of 
love is more passionate than Heidegger’s and his approach to writing is 
more literary, at least in comparison to the early Heidegger of the 1920s and 
1930s that Bataille criticizes. In addition, Bataille’s criticism of Heidegger’s 
understanding of sociality as presupposing divisions of rank, as 
characterized by already-given degrees of power, is compatible with 
Nancy’s essential point that Heidegger reintroduces a fixed and totalizing 
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conception of the social when he ought to be more attentive to the 
interruption of self-present subjectivity brought by finitude. 
In the same review of Levinas that includes many of Bataille’s sharpest 
criticisms of Heidegger, he also takes care to dissociate himself from what he 
sees as an existentialist aestheticism prescribed by Jean Wahl.11 Bataille allies 
himself with Levinas’s approach to the il y a. Levinas’s il y a, in contrast to 
Heidegger’s Es gibt, is raw existence outside subjectivity and perception. 
This il y a is inherently painful and cannot be perceived according to the 
standards of rational philosophical demonstration. Instead, the il y a is 
attested to by experience and recorded in literary writing. The literature of il 
y a, for Levinas and Bataille, cannot be appreciated in an aesthetic manner; 
its effects frustrate any contemplation of beauty. Consequently, Bataille 
argues that an aesthetic appreciation of language domesticates experience 
and re-instills a sense of mastery and comfort he wishes to dispel.12 From 
this perspective, the turn towards language as the house of Being found in 
the later Heidegger, the writings of the 1940s and after, remains complicit in 
the fixity of the world’s social responsibilities. Heidegger remains a counter-
revolutionary thinker despite his eventual cleaving to the language of 
poetry.13 
For this reason, we should approach Nancy’s account of “literary 
communism” with Bataille’s criticism of aestheticism in mind. Nancy refers 
to the “literary communism” that he tentatively advocates as a “clumsy 
expression.”14 First we should be clear that Nancy is not specifying a simply 
belle-lettristic point of view, or advocating that the literati should live in 
common or indicate directives for economic production! Nancy conveys this 
possibility as “something that would be the sharing of community in and by 
its writing, its literature.”15 To be more precise, he argues that the ambiguity 
and singularity of literary expression serves as a name for a new account of 
communism that would appreciate a community of finite beings: 
A singular being does not emerge or rise up against the 
background of a chaotic, undifferentiated identity of beings, or 
against the background of their unitary assumption, or that of a 
becoming, or that of a will. A singular being appears as finitude 
itself: at the end (or at the beginning), with the contact of the skin 
(or the heart) of another singular being, at the confines of the same 
singularity that is, as such, always other, always shared, always 
exposed.16 
This finite community would be essentially differentiated from a work or a 
project. However, it would not be simply luxurious, nor quiescent. Rather, 
this community presents itself as a “task and a struggle.”17 We must consider 
whether the task carried by this community would be essentially apolitical, 
possible in all societies, or whether it indicates an imperative for social or 
political change. Nancy indicates, to a degree, that this inoperative 
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community exists anywhere there is sociality: “it could not happen that in 
the social desert there would not be, however slight, even inaccessible, some 
community.”18 This indicates that the realization or awareness of this 
community is a matter of degree; the social world might reflect this 
existential community to a greater or lesser extent. Nancy indicates that 
post-Stalinist states and right-wing fascisms, as well as the current 
hegemony of liberal capitalism, all close off this community of finitude to a 
much greater degree than an alternative social order might. 
Nancy’s insistence on the redefinition of revolution should suggest the 
imperative to think through the type of social transformation that a better 
reading of finitude and community might enable.19 Nancy indicates a 
complex relation to the Marxian understanding of communism and the 
revolutionary movements of the Marxist tradition. He writes of Marx’s 
understanding of social labor practiced in “primitive” communism as a 
crucial insight into the understanding of being-with-others that he 
advocates: “Community means here the socially exposed particularity in 
opposition to the socially imploded generality characteristic of capitalism.”20 
This indicates that Nancy’s understanding of community is not a liberal one, 
and that his understanding of labor in the productive sense, and the 
property it produces, are not meant to remain within the horizon of 
commodity capitalism. On the other hand, he dissociates the elaboration of 
the inoperative community from the traditional communist struggle.21 He 
argues that Marxist communism has generally taken the form of a 
humanism that presupposes the immanence of man and fails to appreciate 
finitude.22 His indications of a concrete political approach appropriate to the 
insights of Bataille and Heidegger are tentative and avoid prescription. 
Maurice Blanchot, in a very late writing inspired by Nancy’s formulations, 
suggests that Paris in May 1968, during the fabled alliance of students and 
workers, presented a historical realization of the communism that Nancy 
describes.23 This raises the question of what sorts of direct social events 
might correspond to or be inspired by the kind of community that Nancy 
advocates and describes, resting on finitude and exceeding humanist 
preconceptions. 
 
Lingis and Revolutionary Action 
As an extension and possible alteration of this point of view, we might read 
Lingis’s work and in particular his book of 1994, The Community of Those Who 
Have Nothing in Common. In this work, Lingis suggests the possibility of a 
somewhat more pragmatic and historically situated approach to revolution, 
while pursuing a line of thought suggested by Nancy and Blanchot. Lingis is 
clearly deeply indebted to these two thinkers, and he begins The Community 
of Those Who Have Nothing in Common by conceiving community with the 
centrality of the dying; that is, the lived experience of finitude. 
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Lingis distinguishes himself from Nancy by a much more anecdotal, 
empiricist, fictive or memoiristic style. Unlike Nancy’s more abstract 
descriptions, Lingis provides a series of vignettes that illustrate the ethical 
relation and singular elements of sociality. He often provides accounts of his 
travels; this suggests a more personal point of view, though his writing calls 
into question any simple autobiographical interpretation. He also 
emphasizes cultural difference as a locus of alterity. For Lingis, as for Nancy, 
all communication is singular, including cases of an apparently “common” 
language or culture. However, Lingis often alludes to the concrete encounter 
with those to whom one feels alien, that is, “foreigners,” as a significant 
point of evidence in the discussion of this truth. In addition, Nancy’s focus 
on the so-called Third Word, at the periphery of capitalist commercial 
circulation, draws attention to the specific ethical demands presented by 
indigence born of exploitation and neglect. 
Implicitly, this raises a political question to Nancy, who devotes much 
of his work to approaches to love and myth rather than more traditional 
leftist themes of exploitation and oppression. Nancy emphasizes the 
singularity of all communication without regard to geographical space or 
the differences between economic comfort and hardship. He articulates the 
need to attend to finitude as a groundless ground for community 
universally. In contrast, Lingis’s work gives the distinct impression that an 
ethical obligation with political consequences is especially evident towards 
those people who suffer and who are abandoned: “We obscurely feel that 
our generation is being judged, ultimately, by the abandon of the 
Cambodians, and Somalians, and the social outcasts in the street of our own 
cities.”24 
Further, Lingis emphasizes figures of revolution, who are absent from 
Nancy’s analysis. In The Community of Those Who Have Nothing in Common, 
the Nicaraguan Sandinista guerrilla provides an example of an “intruder” 
who brings an encounter with alterity. Lingis names Daniel Ortega and 
describes an anonymous participant in the movement.25 At the conclusion of 
his later work The Imperative, Lingis provides these heroic figures as 
examples for ethical action: “When I deliberate, it is not to ask what just 
anyone would do in this situation. It is to ask what Malcolm X would do, 
what Subcomandante Marcos would do.”26 He also indicates Mohandas 
Karamchand Gandhi as an exemplary figure.27 In other works, Lingis 
commends the speeches of Nelson Mandela and, in particular, the iconic 
figure Che Guevara.28 
It is worth considering what grounds Lingis has for the presentation of 
these figures as exemplary. On the face of it, this might seem to reintroduce 
the conception of hierarchy criticized by Bataille. While all these men are 
generally viewed as left-wing leaders, they are not orthodox Marxists so 
much as nationalists. With the exception of Gandhi, none of these figures are 
pacifist and some are distinguished by their arguments in favor of the 
1 2 0  |  R e v o l u t i o n  w i t h o u t  G u a r a n t e e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XX, No 1 (2012)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2012.523 
necessity of armed self-defense by oppressed peoples. In addition, all of 
these figures, as nationalists, have aimed their struggles at the establishment 
of a nation-state.  The stakes are quite high, because Nancy’s criticism of 
traditional political philosophy is aimed at the pernicious fantasy of a closed 
or incarnated society. Is this, then, inconsistent with the insight Nancy has 
developed? Is Lingis re-introducing the foundation of a collective subject by 
means of a “great man” who offers a personality cult to be imitated by the 
masses? 
Lingis associates these left-wing nationalists with an impersonal 
imperative to aid those who are in need, abandoned, or in a state of physical 
suffering.29 Gandhi, Mandela, X, Guevara, Ortega, and Marcos can also be 
linked, despite their differences, in terms of their individual practices of the 
critical retrieval of a cultural tradition. Their cultural nationalisms are 
aligned with anti-imperialism, socialism, egalitarianism, anti-racism, and 
sometimes elements of feminism. Nancy is most critical of the communist 
tradition, indeed most political thought, for its reliance on or purported 
realization of a human essence.30 In contrast, Lingis champions heroes for 
whom the advocacy of humanism is paramount; Guevara in particular is 
generally an emblem of revolutionary humanism.31 
Lingis’s political outlook can be discerned by reference to his writings 
on ethics in The Imperative, published in 2000. Like Nancy, he does not write 
a systematic political philosophy or revolutionary theoretical writings; he 
devotes much more attention to singular or individual affective experiences. 
He draws out considerations of political responsibility through a series of 
examples and axioms. In this work, he writes of an ethical injunction similar 
to Immanuel Kant’s but exceeding the limits of its rationalist humanism. He 
writes: 
We speak in order to give the other her own voice. We speak in 
order that the other can speak for himself…Speech becomes grave 
and imperative when we speak for infants, for foreigners who do 
not speak the language. When we speak for those in a coma, for the 
imprisoned, the tortured, the massacred, those buried in mass 
graves.32 
Lingis views the political action, the mass ethical action, of the left-wing 
nationalists as speaking and acting on behalf of the exploited and murdered 
of history. Here there is an implicit link to Subcomandante Marcos’s speech 
in the film A Place Called Chiapas, in which he declares, on behalf of the 
Zapatista Army of National Liberation: “It is our day, the day of the dead.”33 
Lingis and Marcos conceive of revolution as inspired and produced by the 
victims of the past who can no longer speak but whose memory emboldens 
others. Justice rests on the awareness of those away from the scene of 
politics, those excluded to the point of having lost their lives. This notion of 
justice as requiring a third party distinct from dialogical relations and 
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contestations can be found in the political thought of Sartre as well as the 
ethical writings of Levinas. 
Both Nancy and Lingis suggest a new consideration of ethics and 
politics that avoids liberal presuppositions regarding a free and rational 
subject as starting point and goal. Instead, these two contemporary thinkers 
advocate community as irreducible to experience and progressive political 
change. Their positions can be strengthened by an account of the discoveries 
of phenomenological thinkers of the previous generation who also aimed to 
reinvent the possibilities of politics. Unlike Lingis and Nancy, Sartre and 
Levinas wrote on behalf of subjectivity. For Sartre, this emanates from a 
concern with a free creative subject charged with liberating his fellows; for 
Levinas, ethical subjectivity only appears with a profound experience of 
heteronomy in the awareness of another. I argue, however, that the political 
innovations of the former share many insights with the ethical discoveries of 
the latter. For Sartre and Levinas, “the subject” does not denote a self-
present, rational, or autonomous being; rather subjectivity is written 
patiently and descriptively as the kernel of the community elucidated by 
their successors, Lingis and Nancy. 
 
Sartre and Revolution 
I argue for two possible post-Heideggerian points of contact with Lingis’s 
proposed praxis. The first is Jean-Paul Sartre, who championed the 
revolutionary vanguard of the Third World. In general, the existentialist 
Marxist schema is discarded by many contemporary thinkers, and may seem 
a relic at first glance. Nancy alludes to Sartre’s description of communism as 
the horizon of our time, acknowledging its partial relevance, but in order to 
argue that rather a “communist exigency or demand communicates with the 
gesture by means of which we must go farther than all possible horizons.”34 
Nancy associates Sartre with a totalizing historical method according to 
which communism corresponds to the realization of an essential human 
freedom, rather than an exploration of communication as it exceeds any 
historical realization of essence. Blanchot, in his book inspired by Nancy, is 
dismissive towards the fused group, which Sartre develops as a 
phenomenological account of the revolutionary fighters commanded by 
figures such as Guevara. Blanchot associates this path with suicide cults and 
fascism.35 I suggest that this portrayal of Sartre and his political ideals is 
uncharitable. To the contrary, Sartre’s analyses suggest, in part, grounds for 
action on behalf of the excluded, such as that spoken by Marcos and 
elaborated by Lingis. 
Unlike Nancy, the early Sartre does not allow for Heidegger’s notion of 
a fundamentally social aspect, equiprimordial with ontological solitude. 
Sartre does not take sociality as primary; however, he also dismisses the 
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possibility of the “destiny of a people” to which Heidegger alludes.36 Sartre 
in 1943 does allow for the possibility of a perception of a community; 
however, perception of fraternity is only psychological, held by an 
individual, and need not be confirmed by others.37 Sartre’s human 
consciousness transcends immanence; for Nancy, only the communication 
born of finitude can do this. There is, however, even in this early Sartre the 
implication of a desire for revolutionary humanism: “the ideal We-subject” 
as a “unity of transcendences.”38 Sartre’s later work will suggest that this 
very universal “We-subject”, a revolutionary humanity entirely in command 
of nature, along the lines suggested by a Marxist Hegelianism, might be in 
fact be approachable. 
Thomas R. Flynn has demonstrated that Sartre progresses from his early 
concern with an abstract freedom to an increasing imperative toward the 
concrete realization of freedom in society.39 We see an increasing concern 
with fraternity and equality, and with the possibilities of concrete freedom, 
in Sartre’s later work. For him, impersonal economic laws could never 
produce revolution.40 Sartre argues that the revolutionary qua revolutionary 
is a worker with first-hand knowledge of the concrete productive 
possibilities of society, but also made revolutionary by his oppression and 
agitated by the curtailment of his freedom by the inherited power of the 
bourgeoisie. However, for Sartre, these first two conditions cannot possibly 
suffice for revolutionary action, as they might be rationalized as necessary or 
natural. The specific capacity for revolutionary thought and action can only 
be the ability of a free human being. This subject is “defined by his going 
beyond the situation in which he is placed,” specifically his temporal 
orientation toward the future.41 
For this reason, Sartre will eventually assert an absolute distinction 
between the mass – which is inert and merely self-identical, presenting itself 
for analysis – and the class, which is free and self-conscious: “Classes don’t 
just happen to exist, they are made.”42 It is the nature of engagement to 
overcome identity, either in an individual or in a group. Sartre’s argument is 
not merely an existentialist critique of the presuppositions of official 
Communism. Rather, Sartre begins to assimilate an aspect of Marxism 
towards which he had previously found alien: the possibility of a collective 
subject. As Sartre writes, the work relationship is not only between man and 
nature, but also between man and man; the nature of collective labor tends 
to produce a class, rather than merely an aggregate of laboring individuals.43 
For this reason, a revolutionary subject is essentially relational. As for 
Nancy, it is on communication between profoundly limited singular beings 
that revolution is built. In Critique of Dialectical Reason, Sartre will examine 
Stalinism as an increasing bureaucratization of the possibilities of the fused 
group. This culminates in near-total submission to what he calls the practico-
inert, a dead and sedimented reification of past praxes. In Sartre’s fused 
group, “[i]f there is a leader, each one is leader in the name of the leader.”44 
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It is Sartre’s contention that it should be possible for such a group, like 
Resistance cadres, to be fully democratic in their shared project. Every 
individual is capable of free thought and action to a degree left untheorized 
by even the most supple Marxism.45 It is imperative even for the 
enthusiastically Marxist Sartre that “an already lived History resists any a 
prior schematism.”46 This means that every step of the way, historical events 
can only be produced by individuals who are in possession of some small 
margin of free action: “we must expect to find the support of collective 
objects in the concrete activity of individuals.”47 
Sartre’s investigations into existential psychoanalysis discovered that 
human beings tended to be far more determined from without – by 
economics, history, society, their family, and other factors – than he had 
originally believed to be the case. However, he maintained throughout the 
possibility of a marginal transformation that he named freedom; the capacity 
by which all individuals can produce a discrepancy with the social 
framework into which they are thrown. For this reason, Sartre promised to 
reveal history as a “detotalized totality.”48 The revolution itself requires action 
that is not guaranteed by history – action that will only come in to the world 
through concrete individuals. His Marxism strives to provide an adequate 
description of these possibilities, one that settles neither on a purely 
individual investigation of neuroses and family romance, nor a macrocosmic 
study of economic and historical relations.  
 Sartre indicates that basic social existence is “an ensemble each of 
whose members is determined in alterity by the others.”49 The question he 
tries to answer is how this series is determined and negated by History and 
transformed into a group whose members would be “determined by the 
others in reciprocity.”50 This is the process by which an oppressed class 
would adopt a revolutionary praxis.51 Sartre indicates that the beginning of 
the bond between individuals is an “immediate discovery of oneself in the 
Other.”52 The group's permanence depends on a “regulatory third person,” a 
possibly rotating position of quasi-transcendence that “stands in a tense and 
contradictory relation of contradiction-immanence.”53 All actions in the 
group are reciprocal; an individual's action has bearing on her comrades; “in 
driving my tenacity to the limit, I produce this tenacity everywhere.”54 
Violence is wielded, defensively against the enemy, but also a sovereign 
“violence against necessity.”55 Any spokesman can represent the group as a 
whole; “his reactions are those of the group as a totality which is embodied 
in each of its temporary modalities.”56 The individual's immersion in the 
group depends on the pledge, which is the hinge between his inner world 
and the demands of social discipline. 
The contrast between Lingis and Marcos, on one hand, and Sartre, on 
the other, is that for the former the “third party” is conceived and 
experienced as dead. Rather than discovering their commonalities in the 
presence of a vanguard figure, Lingis advocates a revolutionary group 
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similar to that practiced by Marcos and the EZLN, achieving co-implication 
between self and others in a collective endeavor because of the witness of 
the dead. This is a decisive link with Nancy. While Lingis maintains the 
significance of the guerrilla fighter as revolutionary figure, this figure is 
essentially linked to finitude; not only to the anticipation of death but to the 
profound experience of those who have already died. This presence of death 
as a political factor links Lingis’s revision of Sartre to Levinas and to Bataille 
and in particular to their insistence on the il y a. 
 
Levinas’s Ethical Subjectivity 
Supplementing Sartre, Levinas presents a second possible source for a post-
Heideggerian revolutionary project. Levinas is much less clearly aligned 
with revolutionary politics than Sartre; while he was sympathetic towards 
the left, he is often remembered, politically, for his Zionist engagement.57 
However, his challenging work of 1974, Otherwise than Being, which presents 
a meditation on the ethical subject, is rich in possibilities for political 
thought.58 Unlike the early Sartre, Levinas’s subject is in relation with 
another in essence. While Sartre views collectivity as an accomplishment, for 
Levinas, as for Nancy, it is at the origin of existence and consciousness. For 
Levinas, unlike the existentialists, subjectivity is not an isolated self-
consciousness. Subjectivity as such is the calling into question of freedom in 
the presence of responsibility to others, rather than freedom itself. As Lingis 
describes it, “a relationship with alterity as such is constitutive of 
subjectivity.”59 
This ethical subjectivity beyond and prior to self-consciousness relies on 
the il y a advocated by Levinas and Bataille. Levinas argues that the 
“encumberment of the there is” is necessary for ethics.60 This is because the il 
y a, a painful excess of being, interrupts the self-presence that would 
otherwise allow for a pre-ethical autonomy and rational certainty. In a sense 
Levinas appears to be the precise opposite of Sartre, given that it is a 
profound lack of freedom that opens up the possibility of ethics, an 
experience of being held hostage by responsibility and captured by one’s 
body. Levinas describes the ethical subject as follows: 
Vulnerability, exposure to outrage, to wounding, passivity more 
passive than all patience, passivity of the accusative form, trauma 
of accusation suffered by a hostage to the point of persecution, 
implicating the identity of the hostage who substitutes himself for 
the others: all this is the self, a defecting or defeat of the ego’s 
identity. And this pushed to the limit is sensibility, sensibility as the 
subjectivity of the subject. It is a substitution for another, one in the 
place of another expiation.61 
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This passivity that damages and overcomes identity corresponds to a 
persecution prior to any choice or commitment.62 At a certain moment, this 
seems to risk an entirely paralyzing and guilt-ridden conception of human 
existence. However, Levinas’s work emphasizes that this responsibility is 
shared. Commonality of responsibility prevents the potential nihilism of 
being held hostage as the truth of subjectivity. In a manner not entirely 
divorced from Sartre, a common experience of devotion to an external party 
leads to the possibility of action. 
Lingis translated Otherwise than Being into English in 1981. In his 
introduction, he emphasizes that rather than a simple asymmetry according 
to which my freedom is impeded by responsibility to my neighbor, it is the 
appearance of a third separate from both me and you that raises the 
possibility of justice. As Lingis puts it, 
To find that the one before whom and for whom I am responsible is 
responsible in his turn before and for another is not to find his 
order put on me relativized or cancelled. It is to discover the 
exigency for justice, for an order among responsibilities.63 
The recognition of shared responsibility opens the possibility of an 
understanding of ethics that is not purely personal or guilt-driven; rather, a 
profoundly social justice. This awareness of a third party that is “other than 
the other…makes me one among others.”64 Awareness of equality in 
responsibility, brought by the presence of an exterior agent, recalls the role 
of the third person in Sartre’s work. Lingis’s emphasis on figures of national 
liberation—Gandhi, Mandela, and Guevara—suggests that they function as 
a collective “third party” mediating social relations in the direction of justice. 
However, Lingis renders these figures far more implicated in an 
appreciation of finitude. This is not merely through the revolutionary’s 
risking of his life but through a more significant relationship to speech on 
behalf of those politically excluded who for that reason are ethically 
consequent. This view of the third has the potential to unite Levinas with 
Sartre and Lingis with Nancy. Nancy’s work suggests an altered conception 
of the political that forestalls questions of a human essence or a unified 
collective work. Lingis, through a background in the Sartrean political and 
the Levinasan ethical, returns to the question of justice in a manner more 
recognizable to the history of revolutions. 
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